William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 7 | Issue 3

1981

Assumption of the Risk and the Fireman's Rule

Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
Recommended Citation
(1981) "Assumption of the Risk and the Fireman's Rule," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 7: Iss. 3, Article 5.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol7/iss3/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Article 5

et al.: Assumption of the Risk and the Fireman's Rule

ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK AND THE FIREMAN'S RULE
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently has redefined the law regarding the right of
firemen andpolicemen to recoverfrom tortfeasorsfor injuriessustainedin the course
of their duties. This Note discusses the evolution of the 'freman's rule" andprovides a criticalanalysis of recent modifications to the rule.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the Minnesota Supreme Court has modified the law
regarding recovery by injured firemen and policemen.' In three cases,
Armstrong v. Mailand,2 Hannah v. Jensen,3 and Grjfiths v. Lovelette Transfer

Co. ,4 the court replaced the old "fireman's rule," based upon the law of
landowners' and occupiers' liability, with a modern rule, based upon primary assumption of the risk.
This Note will examine the history of the fireman's rule and the evolution of the doctrine of assumption of the risk into two separate theories,
primary and secondary assumption of the risk. The decision of the Minnesota court to retain the fireman's rule in the form of primary assumption of the risk will be discussed both in terms of its application to cases
involving firemen and policemen, and its potential impact on general
tort law. In addition, the use of primary assumption of the risk to bar
recovery on the basis of strict liability, an issue not fully discussed by the
Minnesota court in either Armstrong or Hannah, will be examined.
II.

THE HISTORY OF THE FIREMAN'S RULE

Historically, firemen injured while fighting fires have been restricted in
their right to recover from the negligent owner of the land upon which
1. The Minnesota Legislature recently enacted a law prohibiting the use of the fireman's rule to deny recovery to "peace officers" as defined by Minnesota Statutes section
626.84(1). Act of Mar. 22, 1982, ch. 601, § 3, 1982 Minn. Laws _. This law likely will be
challenged by firemen on equal protection grounds. See note 239 ifta.
2. 284 N.W.2d 343 (Minn. 1979).
3. 298 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 1980).
4. 313 N.W.2d 602 (Minn. 1981).
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the fire occurred. 5 The law limiting the firemen's cause of action against
landowners, commonly called the fireman's rule, was based upon the
5. Gibson v. Leonard, 143 Ill. 182, 32 N.E. 182 (1892) was the first case to restrict
the right of a fireman to recover from a negligent owner of land. In that case, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that a fireman who entered premises in the performance of his duty
was a mere licensee to whom the landowner owed no duty other than to refrain from
willful or wanton conduct. See id at 196, 32 N.E. at 186.
In granting firemen the status of licensees, the court cited as its only authority a
paragraph in Cooley on Torts wherein the rights of firemen were set out. That paragraph
states:
A third class of licenses comprehends those cases in which the law gives permission to enter a man's premises. This permission has no necessary connection
with the owner's interest, and is always given on public grounds. An instance is
where fire breaks out in a city. Here the public authorities, and even private
individuals, may enter upon adjacent premises as they may find it necessary or
convenient in their efforts to extinguish or to arrest the spread of the flames. The
law of overruling necessity licenses this, and will not suffer the owner of a lot to
stand at its borders and exclude those who would use his premises as vantage
ground in staying the conflagration.
Id at 189-90, 32 N.E.2d at 183 (quoting T. COOLEY, TORTS 313 (1st ed. 1880)).
It has been noted that Judge Cooley made no distinction between a licensee and a
business invitee, but labeled all who had permission to enter upon land as licensees. See
Comment, Are Firemen and Policemen Licensees or Invitees?, 35 MICH. L. REV. 1157, 1159
(1937). The paragraph cited above is therefore improper authority for a holding that
designates firemen as mere licensees rather than as business invitees. See id. Judge Cooley
merely states that firemen enter land with permission without determining their status as
entrants. See id Nevertheless, courts in many jurisdictions followed the Gibson holding
based upon this dubious authority that relegated firemen to the status of licensees. See id
at 1158 n.3.
The Minnesota Supreme Court first adopted the Gibson view in Hamilton v. Minneapolis Desk Mfg. Co., 78 Minn. 3, 80 N.W. 693 (1899). The Gibson court recognized the
harshness of the common-law rule, but held against the plaintiff fireman, stating, "it appears to be settled that the owner or occupant of a building owe[s] no duty to keep it in a
reasonably safe condition for members of a public fire department who might, in the exercise of their duties, have occasion to enter the building." Id at 5, 80 N.W. at 694. In the
view of the Hamilton court, "[hiowever meritorious a case [the plaintiff] may seemingly
have, any expansion of the fireman's right of recovery would have to come from the legislature." Id at 6, 80 N.W. at 694. Neither the courts nor the legislature challenged or
limited the Hamilton holding for the next 42 years, but in 1942, the Minnesota court was
again faced with the issue. In Mulcrone v. Wagner, 212 Minn. 478, 4 N.W.2d 97 (1942),
the court refused to allow a fireman who was injured while performing a routine fire
inspection to recover from the owner of the building. The Mulrone court stated:
The cases seem to draw a clear line of distinction between ordinary and
business invitees and policemen and firemen by the great weight of authority,
the general rule is that, absent statute or ordinance, one who comes upon premises in the discharge of his duty, but without an express or implied invitation to
enter, is a licensee to whom the owner or occupant owes no duty except to refrain
from injuring him willfully or wantonly and to exercise ordinary care to avoid
imperiling him by any active conduct.
Id at 482, 4 N.W.2d at 99. The court reiterated the view of the Hamilton court that any
change in the duty owed to firemen by negligent landowners should be accomplished by
legislative action. See id at 482-83, 4 N.W.2d at 99. Because the legislature had failed to
respond to the challenge of the Hamilton court to elevate the status of firemen, the supreme
court was reluctant to expand the firemen's right of recovery. See id
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traditional system of classifying entrants upon land as trespassers, licensees, or invitees. 6 Under that system, the duty of the landowner depended upon the legal status of the entrant; the least duty being owed to
trespassers and the greatest to invitees.7 Although firemen have been
6. See Comment, supra note 5. The method of determining the liability of landowners and occupiers was unique in that it was based upon the status of the person entering
upon the land, as well as the conduct of the owner. See J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW
§ 19.01 (1977); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 58, at 357 (4th ed.
1971). The Restatement defines the three categories of persons entering upon land as:
§ 329. Trespasser Defined.
A trespasser is a person who enters or remains upon land in the possession of
another without a privilege to do so created by the possessor's consent or otherwise.
§ 330. Licensee Defined.
A licensee is a person who is privileged to enter or remain on land only by virtue
of the possessor's consent.
§ 332. Invitee Defined.
(1) An invitee is either a public invitee or a business visitor.
(2) A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land as a
member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the public.
(3) A business visitor is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land for a
purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor
of the land.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 329, 330, 332 (1965). Comment a of section 332
states:
"Invitee" is a word of art, with a special meaning in the law. This meaning is
more limited than that of "invitation" in the popular sense, and not all of those
who are invited to enter upon land are invitees. A social guest may be cordially
invited, and strongly urged to come, but he is not an invitee. . . . Invitees are
limited to those persons who enter or remain on land upon an invitation which
carried with it an implied representation, assurance, or understanding that reasonable care has been used to prepare the premises, and make them safe for their
reception.
Id § 332, Comment a.
For further discussion of the status of the business invitee, see Prosser, Business Visitors
and Invitees, 26 MINN. L. REV. 573 (1942).
7. See W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 58, at 357. Because trespassers entered land without the owner's permission, they were owed no duty by the landowner except the avoidance of intentional injury. See id; J. DOOLEY, supra note 6, § 19.03, at 379. Limited
exceptions were made to this general rule of nonliability, and some courts required the
landowner to exercise reasonable care in the case of frequent trespassers, known trespassers, or in situations in which the landowner engaged in dangerous activities. See W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 58, at 360-64.
Licensees entered land for their own purposes but with the permission of the owner or
occupier. The landowner generally owed the licensee no duty to keep his land in safe
condition, to discover dangerous conditions, or to warn the licensee of open and obvious
dangers. See J. DOOLEY, supra note 6, § 19.04, at 381. An owner had a duty to warn a
licensee of hidden dangers of which the owner had knowledge. Id In addition, a landowner was liable for injuries caused to a licensee by the landowner's active negligence if he
should have expected that the licensee would not discover the danger or did not know of
the owner's activities and of the risk involved. Id; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
341-342 (1965).
A higher duty of care was owed to the invitee who entered upon the land. The pos-
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granted the status of invitees in a few cases, 8 the majority of courts have
held them to be licensees. 9 Accordingly, landowners had no duty to
avoid negligently starting fires or to keep their premises free from defects
unrelated to the fire.10
Applying a rigid system of classification to the determination of a
landowner's duty to firemen proved to be awkward and unsatisfactory. I1
Licensees were deemed to be owed a lesser duty because they entered for
their own purposes although with the consent of the owner.' 2 Invitees
were granted a higher status because the landowner derived a benefit
from their presence.13 Firemen did not fit squarely into either the licensee or the invitee category because their entrance was based upon legal
authority rather than upon consent or business invitation,14 and because
sessor of land had an affirmative duty to protect invitees from known or foreseeable dangers and to use reasonable care to discover hidden dangers. See W. PROSSER, supra note 6,
§ 61, at 385, 393. This higher obligation has been based upon two separate theories. Id at
386, 388. The first theory is that an affirmative duty of care is imposed upon the owner in
return for the economic benefit he receives from the presence of the business visitor, as in
the case of customers entering a store. Id at 386-87. The second and more widely accepted theory is that the owner owes a higher duty when he encourages persons to enter
his premises to further his own purpose and thereby represents that he has exercised reasonable care to make the premises safe for those entering for that purpose. Id at 388. This
second theory expands the term "invitee" to include those members of the public who
enter for the owner's purpose but who offer no economic benefit to the owner, such as
nonpaying spectators or users of public facilities. Id at 389-90.
8. See Dini v. Naiditch, 20 111. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960); Horcher v. Guerin, 94
Ill. App. 2d 244, 236 N.E.2d 576 (1968); Netherton v. Arends, 81 111. App. 2d 391, 225
N.E.2d 143 (1967); Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery, 229 N.Y. 10, 127 N.E. 491 (1920).
9. See, e.g., Giorgi v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 355, 72 Cal. Rptr. 119
(1968); Mulcrone v. Wagner, 212 Minn. 478, 4 N.W.2d 97 (1942); Hamilton v. Minneapolis Desk Mfg. Co., 78 Minn. 3, 80 N.W. 693 (1899). See generaly Note, Landowner'sNegligence Liability to Persons Enteringas a Matter ofRight or Under a Privilege of Frivate Necessity, 19
VAND. L. REV. 407, 407 & n.1.
10. See W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 61, at 397; Comment, An Examinationof the Cafiformna Fireman's Rule, 6 PAC. L. J. 660, 660-61 (1975) (landowner's liability eliminated both
for injuries resulting from defects in premises unrelated to fire and for those resulting from
owner's negligence in creating condition requiring firemens' entrance); Comment, Giorgi
v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.: The "Fireman'sRule"In California, an Anachronism?, 4 U.S.F.L.
REV. 125, 125 (1969); ef Washington v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 66 Ill. 2d 103, 106, 361
N.E.2d 282, 284 (1976) (distinction created between negligent failure to maintain property
(breach of duty) and negligent creation of fire (no breach of duty)). For an analysis of
Washington v. Atlantic Richfield Co., see Note, Landowner's Liability to Inj'uredFi'refghtersin
Illinois-Washington v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 DEPAuL L. REV. 137 (1977).
11. See Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Prods. Co., 232 Minn. 394, 397, 45 N.W.2d 549,
551 (1951); J. DOOLEY, supra note 6, § 19.07, at 387; W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 61, at
397 ("there has always been an aspect of absurdity about [decisions categorizing firemen
as licensees]'); Comment, An Examination of the California Fireman'sRule, supra note 10.
12. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
13. Id
14. See Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Prods. Co., 232 Minn. 394, 396, 45 N.W.2d 549,
550-51 (1951); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 27.14, at 1501 (4th ed.
1974) ("[firemen] owe a duty to the public,. . . the right to enter private property is a
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they entered the premises not for their own purposes but for the benefit
of the landowner and the public in general.15 Despite the difficulty of
placing firemen into a particular category, the courts continued for many
years to treat firemen as licensees.16 This was primarily due to the fear
that placing a duty on landowners to keep their premises reasonably safe
from the infrequent and unpredictable entrances of firemen would prove
too burdensome.17 An additional and much less valid reason was given:
part of that duty, and does not depend on the private summons"). It has been argued that
because the fireman came upon the land under a right of law and the landowner could not
lawfully bar their entrance, there could be no invitation. See Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper
Prods. Co., 232 Minn. at 396, 45 N.W.2d at 551; 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra. This
rationale for refusing to grant invitee status to firemen has been criticized, since landowners presumably would not refuse entrance to a fireman. See Comment, supra note 5, at
1161. One writer has noted that "if invitation is called for, it is at least clearly present
when [a fireman] comes in response to a desperate call for help." W. PROSSER, supra note
6, § 61, at 397.
Additional criticism has been leveled at courts' inconsistent application of the concept of right of law to justify their refusal to grant firemen invitee status. "[I]t is incongruous to say that a fireman on the [landowner's] premises to fight a fire cannot be an invitee
because there is no invitation, but that he is a licensee even though in reality the occupier
has not granted him permission to enter." Note, supra note 9, at 407-08; see Dini v.
Naiditch, 20 11. 2d 406, 415-16, 170 N.E.2d 881, 885 (1960).
15. See Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Prods. Co., 232 Minn. 394, 396-97, 45 N.W.2d
549, 551 (1951), in which the court, discussing the difficulty of placing firemen within the
traditional classifications, noted that "[fqiremen are regarded as making their entry primarily for the purpose of performing a duty owed to the public. Although the benefit of their
services may accrue to an individual property owner, that fact is incidental." Id (footnote
omitted). The argument that a significant benefit is received by the landowner was advanced to support the elevation of firemen to the invitee classification. Comment, Giorgi
v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.: The "Firemen'sRule"In Caforma, an Anachronim?, supra note
10, at 126; see Dini v. Naiditch, 20 111. 2d 406, 416, 170 N.E.2d 881, 885 (1960) ("If benefit
to the landowner is the decisive factor, it is difficult to perceive why a fireman is not
entitled to that duty of care [owed to an invitee]"); W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 61, at 397
("[iut is of course quite foolish to say that a fireman who comes to extinguish a blaze . . .
confers no economic benefit upon the occupier"). One writer extended the benefit rationale even further, saying "[w]hile the benefit to the landowner would, concededly, be the
greatest where the fire is on his own property, it does not follow that he derives no benefit
from the entry of a fireman for the purpose of fighting a fire next door. Surely he is
interested in controlling the fire so that it will not spread to his property." Comment,
supra note 5, at 1161.
16. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
17. Set Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Prods. Co., 232 Minn. 394, 397, 45 N.W.2d 549,
551 (1951). Professor Prosser concluded:
The one really valid basis for the distinction [between firemen and policemen as
licensees on the one hand and other public employees as invitees on the other]
must lie in the fact that firemen and policemen are likely to enter at unforeseeable times, upon unusual parts of the premises, and under circumstances of
emergency, where care in looking after the premises, and in preparation for the
visit cannot reasonably be looked for.
W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 61, at 397. Prosser has also commented on the widespread
use of the unforeseeability rationale as follows: "[i]t is worthy of note that in every one of
the cases in which recovery has been denied to [firemen], some such element of unusual
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it was thought that landowners might be more reluctant to call firemen
promptly if they knew that they could be held liable for injuries.18 These
arguments are questionable, however, in light of the element, of foreseeability that must be present in a negligence action.19 Only those dangers
that firemen could reasonably be expected to encounter would have to be
removed from the premises. 20 These misplaced concerns caused courts to
perpetuate a harsh rule that frequently led to inequitable results for in21
jured firemen.
Eventually, courts began to recognize that the categories of trespasser,
licensee, and invitee were outdated and unworkable. 22 The classification
system, which had its roots in the English feudal system under which
landowners had supreme rights, was an anachronism in modern industrial society.23

Rather than rejecting the outdated classifications alto-

gether, in a few cases courts attempted to expand the duties owed
firemen by fitting them into the invitee category. 24 In the 1951 case of
and unexpected entry has been present." Prosser, Business Vitors andInvitees, 26 MINN. L.
REV. 573, 610 (1942). He expressed considerable doubt about the validity of the firemens'
unexpected entry as a basis for the decisions. See W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 6 1, at 598;
notes 18-19 infra and accompanying text.
18. See Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Prods. Co., 232 Minn. 394, 397, 45 N.W.2d 549,
551 (1951); J. DOOLEY, supra note 6, § 19.07, at 387. Prosser has stated that "[t]he argument . . . that tort liability might deter landowners from uttering cries of distress is surely
preposterous rubbish." W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 61, at 397; see 2 F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, supra note 14, § 27.14, at 1503.
19. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 14, § 27.14, at 1502; W. PROSSER, supra
note 6, § 61, at 398 ("[The foreseeability of the firemen's entrance] appears to bear upon
the issue of negligent conduct itself, as a matter of foreseeable harm and reasonable care,
rather than affording an arbitrary basis for denying recovery in all cases.").
20. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 14, § 27.14, at 1502; W. PROSSER, Supra
note 6, § 61, at 398. In Dini v. Naiditch, 20 I1. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960), the court
found the landowners liable based upon the foreseeability of the firemen's injuries, stating:
[F]rom the evidence previously noted that defendant failed to provide firedoors
or fire extinguishers, permitted the accumulation of trash and litter in the corridors, and had benzene stored in close proximity to the inadequately constructed
wooden stairway where the fire was located, the jury could have found that defendants failed to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition and that the
hazard of fire, and loss of life fighting it, was reasonably foreseeable.
Id at 417, 170 N.E.2d at 886.
21. Comment, An Examination of the CaliforniaFireman'sRule, supra note 10, at 662; see
Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 414, 170 N.E.2d 881, 884-85 (1960); Mulcrone v. Wagner,
212 Minn. 478, 482, 4 N.W.2d 97, 99 (1942); Hamilton v. Minneapolis Desk Mfg. Co., 78
Minn. 3, 5, 80 N.W. 693, 694 (1899).
22. See W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 62, at 398; note 23 infra and accompanying text.
23. See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 116, 443 P.2d 561, 567, 70 Cal. Rptr.
97, 103 (1968); Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 414, 170 N.E.2d 881, 884 (1960); 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 14, § 27.14, at 1432; Bohlen,Fifiy Years of Torts, 50 HARV.
L. REV. 725, 735-40 (1937).
24. See, e.g., Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Il. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960); Zuercher v.
Northern Jobbing Co., 243 Minn. 166, 66 N.W.2d 892 (1954) (volunteer fireman injured
while installing pump purchased by owner from fire department was business invitee);
Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery, 229 N.Y. 10, 127 N.E. 491 (1920) (fireman was not licensee
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Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Products Co. ,25 the Minnesota Supreme Court
finally removed firemen from the classification system altogether and
granted them a sui generis status. 26 At the time, the decision was viewed

as progressive,2 7 but in fact it only slightly expanded the duty owed to
firemen by landowners. 28 Landowners still had no general duty to keep
their premises safe for members of a public fire department,29 although
they could be liable for failing to warn firemen of hidden dangers of
30
which the landowners had knowledge and the opportunity to disclose.
The Shypulski decision was based upon the court's recognition of the difficulty of attempting to classify firemen as invitees, licensees, or
31
trespassers.
In 1968, the California Supreme Court began a trend toward abolish32
In Rowland v. Chrstian,33
ing the common-law classification scheme.
the court decided that it was no longer appropriate to make an exception
in the case of possessors of land to the general requirement of ordinary
care. 34 In Rowland, the court noted that "[a]n increasing regard for
and owner owed duty to fireman to keep pathway to premises in reasonably safe
condition).
25. 232 Minn. 394, 45 N.W.2d 549 (1951). Plaintiff, a St. Paul fireman, was seriously
injured when a poorly constructed wall collapsed as he was fighting a fire in the defendant's warehouse. Id at 395-96, 45 N.W.2d at 550.
26. Id at 397, 45 N.W.2d at 551; see Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J. 270, 157 A.2d 129
(1960).
27. See 53 MINN. L. REV. 512, 515 (1951).
28. See Note, supra note 9, at 408 & n.7. The author points out that the duty imposed
upon landowners by the Shypulski court to warn of "hidden perils" is the same duty owed
to licensees under the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 341-342
(1965).
29. See Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Prods. Co., 232 Minn. 394, 397, 45 N.W.2d 549,
551 (1951); Note, supra note 9, at 408 & n.7.
30. 232 Minn. at 401, 45 N.W.2d at 553.
31. See id at 396-97, 45 N.W.2d at 550-51.
32. Many jurisdictions have now abolished, in whole or in part, the common-law
classifications. See, e.g., Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625,
630-32 (1958); Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 939 (1973); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1968); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 195 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971); Wood v.
Camp, 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1973); Pickard v. City of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 134, 452 P.2d
445 (1969); Bourg v. Redden, 351 So. 2d 1300 (La. 1977); Bouchard v. DeGagne, 368
Mass. 45,329 N.E.2d 114 (1975); Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973);
Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972); Oulette v. Blanchard, 116
N.H. 552, 364 A.2d 631 (1976); Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386
N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976); O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746 (N.D. 1977); Mariorenzi v.
Joseph DiPonti, Inc., 114 R.I. 294, 333 A.2d 127 (1975); Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 70
Wis. 2d 836, 236 N.W.2d 1 (1975).
33. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). For a discussion of the
history of the abolition of the entrant categories, see Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161,
169-73, 199 N.W.2d 639, 645-45 (1972).
34. 69 Cal. 2d at 117, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
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human safety has led to a retreat from this position," 3 5 and gave examples of the confusing and complex methods that courts had employed in
attempting to avoid the harsh rule that landowners owed a limited duty
to entrants.3 6 The California court chose not to add to that confusion by
straining the common-law rule; instead, it simply abolished the land-entrant classification system, and required landowners to use reasonable
care in avoiding injury to others.3 7 In its opinion, the court stated:
A man's life or limb does not become less worthy of protection by the
law nor a loss less worthy of compensation under the law because he
has come upon the land of another without permission or with permission but without a business purpose. Reasonable people do not ordinarily vary their conduct depending upon such matters, and to focus
upon the status of the injured party as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee
in order to determine whether the landowner has a duty of care, is
contrary to our modern social mores and humanitarian values. The
common law rules obscure rather than illuminate the proper considerations which should govern determination of the question of duty. 38
Not all jurisdictions have completely abolished the classifications of
trespasser, licensee, and invitee.39 In Minnesota, these classifications continued to limit the duty that landowners owed to entrants as late as
1970.40 When the Minnesota Supreme Court abolished the distinctions
between licensees and invitees in 1972, in Peterson v. Balach,4 1 the court
declined to expand the duty owed to trespassers, noting that good reasons often exist for limiting the liability of landowners for injury to those
who enter onto land uninvited.42 The court held that as to all other
entrants, landowners owed a duty to use reasonable care in maintaining
35. Id at 114, 443 P.2d at 565, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
36. Id at 114-16, 443 P.2d at 565-67, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 101-02.
37. Id.at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
38. Id at 118, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
39. Some jurisdictions have retained the common-law classifications and consider the
status of an entrant to be the sole factor in determining the landowner's liability. See, e.g.,
Rehwalt v. American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2, 97 Idaho 634, 550 P.2d 137 (1976);
Pashinian v. Haritonoff, 81 11. 2d 377, 410 N.E.2d 21 (1980); Gerchberg v. Loney, 223
Kan. 446, 576 P.2d 593 (1978); Brown v. Lesh, 604 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. App. 1980); Rennick
v. Hoover, 606 P.2d 1079 (Mont. 1980); Diguido v. Caponi, 18 Ohio St. 2d 122, 247
N.E.2d 732 (1969); Crotty v. Reading Indus., Inc., 235 Pa. Super. 724, 345 A.2d 259
(1975); Egede-Nissen v. Crystal Mountain, Inc., 93 Wash. 2d 127, 606 P.2d 1214 (1980).
The Florida Supreme Court has indicated, in two separate decisions, that the licensee/invitee distinction was relevant only when injury was caused by the condition or use of
the premises, and that when injury is caused by the active personal negligence of the
landowner, ordinary negligence standards would apply, even if the injury occurred on the
defendant's property. See Maldonado v. Jack M. Berry Grove Corp., 351 So. 2d 967 (Fla.
1977); Hix v. Billen, 284 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1973).
40. See Holland v. Hedenstad, 287 Minn. 244, 177 N.W.2d 784 (1970) (no duty to
make premises safe for licensee).
41. 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972).
42. See id at 165, 199 N.W.2d at 642.
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their premises and warning of dangers. 43 The status of the entrant as
licensee or invitee no longer was determinative, but was "one element,
among many to be considered in determining the landowner's liability
under ordinary standards of negligence." 44 The plaintiff's status would
go to the issues of foreseeability of the injury and the right of the plaintiff
to expect the exercise of reasonable care in his behalf.45
III.

RECENT MINNESOTA CASES

Although major changes occurred in the area of landowners' and occupiers' liability generally, the question of what duty was owed to
firemen who entered upon land remained unanswered until 1979. Faced
with that issue in the case of Armstrong v. Mailand,46 the Minnesota
Supreme Court combined the reasonable care standard with primary assumption of the risk to create a new fireman's rule in Minnesota. Firemen who enter property to fight a fire are no longer invitees, licensees, or
sui generis..47 Firemen, like other land entrants, are owed a duty of reasonable care unless they assume the risk in the primary sense. 48 They
assume, in the primary sense, all the reasonably apparent risks of
firefighting. 49 They do not, however, assume risks that are hidden or
unanticipated.50
In Armstrong, three West St. Paul firemen were killed while fighting a
fire at a liquefied petroleum gas storage facility. 51 The fire started near a
truck that was delivering LP gas to the facility, which was located at an
apartment complex. 52 While the firemen were attempting to put out the
43. Id at 174, 199 N.W.2d at 647. Included among the factors to be used to determine whether reasonable care was used are: "foreseeability or possibility of harm; duty to
inspect, repair or warn; reasonableness of inspection or repair, and opportunity and ease of
repair or correction." Id at 174 n.7, 199 N.W.2d at 648 n.7.
44. Id at 173, 199 N.W.2d at 647; see Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 119, 443
P.2d 561, 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103 (1968); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 28 Colo.
App. 400, 404-05, 474 P.2d 796, 799 (1970).
45. Id at 167, 199 N.W.2d at 643; see, e.g., Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469
F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108,
443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537,
489 P.2d 308 (1971); Bourg v. Redden, 351 So. 2d 1300 (1977); Mounsey v. Ellard, 363
Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973); Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639
(1972). One court has noted that the abolition of the classification system did not extinguish the court's function of determining whether the foreseeability of the risk and the
relationship of the parties imposed a duty of due care on the defendant. See Paquette v.
Joyce, 379 A.2d 207 (N.H. 1977).
46. 284 N.W.2d 343 (Minn. 1979).
47. Id at 350.
48. Id
49. Id
50. Id
51. Id at 345-46.
52. Id at 345.
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fire, it spread to the storage tank. 53 This caused a BLEVE, a boiling
liquid expanding vapor explosion, that resulted in the death of the three
firemen. 54 A wrongful death action was commenced against the owner
of the apartment complex, the manufacturer and the installer of the LP
gas tank, and the LP gas supplier.55 In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged
negligence per se, 56 based on alleged violations of state statutes, city fire
ordinances, state fire marshall regulations and industry standards; strict
products liability; and strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities. 57 The trial court, relying on Shypulski v. WaldorfPaper Products Co. ,58
granted summary judgment for the defendants and declined to rule upon
the questions of strict liability for defective products and ultrahazardous
instrumentalities. 5 9 The supreme court affirmed the ruling of the trial
court.

60

The facts of the case indicate that the fire and the resulting explosion
were caused by the combined negligence of the defendants.61 The tank
that exploded was an eleven-thousand-gallon storage tank that had been
installed two years earlier at the Mailand apartment complex as a replacement for several smaller tanks.6 2 The tank required some modifications before it could be used at the apartment complex. 63 The seller of
the tank agreed to make the necessary changes for the installer.64 These
modifications necessitated the installation of a different relief valve,65 but
the seller failed to provide a new valve or to advise the installer to do
so. 66 The installer relied upon the seller's assurances and made no independent inspection of either the tank or the valve. 6 7 When the tank
was installed, it was housed in a wooden structure with a vaporizing unit
53. Id at 347. When the firemen arrived, the fire was burning only near the delivery
truck. One of the firemen attempted to shut off the flow of gas from the truck, but was
unable to get near the truck. Id The fire burned through the line that carried the gas

from the truck to the storage tank. Gas escaped, causing the fire to spread from the truck
to the tank. Id
54. Id Despite efforts by the firefighters to cool the LP gas tank down with water, the
pressure in the tank continued to rise, causing an explosion, the force of which "was compared to the thrust of a Saturn rocket." Id

55. Id
56. Id; Appellant's Brief and Appendix at 45.
57. See note 56 supra.
58. 232 Minn. 394, 45 N.W.2d 549 (1951); see notes 25-31 supra and accompanying

text.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

284 N.W.2d at 347.
Id at 346.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
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that used an open flame.68 No fire wall separated the tank from the unit
as required by the fire code. 69 On the night the explosion occurred, the

driver of the gas delivery truck failed to connect a hose that was used to
equalize the pressure between the truck and the storage tank. 70 In addition, the driver sat inside the cab of the truck while the gas was being
delivered rather than monitoring the flow of gas from outside the truck
as company rules required. 71 The meter on the truck that measured the
flow of gas was improperly installed, and had a broken relief line that
allowed gas to escape and accumulate near the meter and on the ground
underneath it.72
Despite evidence of negligence on the part of the defendants, the
supreme court found that the risk of an LP gas explosion was among the
risks of firefighting that the firemen assumed in the primary sense. 73 The
firemen were aware of the possibility that a BLEVE could occur whenever a fire occurred near an LP gas tank. 74 There was evidence that they
had received special training in fighting LP gas tank fires in response to
7
the installation of the tank at the Mailand apartment complex. 5 The

court concluded that merely because the fire that caused the explosion
might have been the result of hidden defects did not mean that the risk
76
of the BLEVE itself was an unanticipated risk.
The fireman's rule, as redefined in terms of primary assumption of the
risk in Armstrong, 77 was expanded in Hannah v. Jensen. 78 In Hannah, the
court applied the fireman's rule to prevent an on-duty policeman from
recovering from a bar owner under the Minnesota Liquor Liability
(Dram Shop) Act. 79 The policeman was called to the bar to subdue an
68. Id
69. Id
70. Id
71. Id
72. Id.
73. Id at 352.
74. Id at 347, 352-53.
75. Id
76. Id at 347.
77. See notes 107-12 infa and accompanying text.
78. 298 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 1980).
79. Id at 55. The current version of section 340.95 of the Minnesota Liquor Liability
(Dram Shop) Act, which is substantially identical to the 1976 version, states:
Every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person who is
injured in person or in property, or means of support, by any intoxicated person,
or by the intoxication of any person, has a right of action, in his own name,
against any person who, by illegally selling or bartering intoxicating liquors,
caused the intoxication of such person, for all damages, sustained; and all damages recovered by a minor under this section shall be paid either to such minor
or to his parent, guardian, or next friend, as the court directs; and all suits for
damages under this section shall be by civil action in any court of this state
having jurisdiction thereof.
MINN. STAT. § 340.95 (1980).
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intoxicated patron.BO While the policeman was escorting the patron
outside, a fight broke out in which the policeman was injured.81 The
trial court, applying Amstrong, held that although the Dram Shop Act
imposed strict liability upon bar owners to members of the public for
injuries caused by intoxicated persons to whom liquor had been sold illegally, policemen assumed, in the primary sense, the risks of such injury.82
The supreme court upheld the lower court's ruling, stating that the policeman could not recover under the Act because "[t]he risk of injury
from [an intoxicated] person is an inherent part of police work, just as the
'
danger of explosion is an inherent part of firefighting. 83
The court noted that had the Dram Shop Act imposed absolute liability rather than strict liability, the fireman's rule would not have been
applied. 84 The public policy reflected by a statute creating absolute liability would be so strong that the plaintiff's conduct would not be considered. 85 The Hannah court found that the Dram Shop Act imposed only
strict liability, and thus did not reflect a strong public policy in favor of
absolute recovery. 8 6 In addition, the court found a strong countervailing
public policy consideration in the possibility that the imposition of liability would prevent bar owners from calling the police.87 The court felt
that to impose liability under the circumstances would encourage the use
of self-help measures and thereby create an additional risk to the
88
public.
The Hannah decision was accompanied by a strong dissenting opinion. 89 The dissent began by stating that the fireman's rule was "not a
favorite principle of the law," and that its application should be strictly
limited. 90 In addition, the Minnesota court had previously interpreted
the Dram Shop Act as warranting liberal application. 9 ' Therefore, the
court should not have applied the fireman's rule as a bar to an action
brought by a policeman under the Dram Shop Act. 92 The dissent was
not persuaded by the majority's prediction that allowing recovery by policemen would inhibit bar owners from calling police in case of a disturbance. 93 It stated: "In that dram shop insurance will most likely cover
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

298 N.W.2d at 54.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id at 55.
Id
Id (Scott, J., dissenting).
Id
Id
Id at 55, 56.
Id at 56.
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any damages sustained by a police officer, I find it difficult to believe
that bar owners would compromise the physical well-being of their patrons and their establishments by failing to summon appropriate law en9
forcement authorities." 4

In the most recent fireman's rule decision, Griffths v. Lovelette Transfer
Co. ,95 the Minnesota Supreme Court clarified the rule and made it somewhat less restrictive. In Grffiths, a police officer who was directing traffic
at the scene of an automobile accident was injured when a third car went
off the road and caught a loose guide wire on its bumper, causing the
power pole attached to the wire to whip around and knock the officer to
the ground. 96 The trial court concluded that officer Griffiths' claim was
not barred by the fireman's rule because the risk of injury was not reasonably apparent to the officer. 97 Three questions were certified to the
supreme court. (1) Does the fireman's rule apply to police officers investigating an automobile accident? (2) Must the particular risk of injury
be reasonably apparent to the police officer or must only a general risk be
apparent? (3) Is the determination of whether the risk was reasonably
apparent to be made by the court or the jury?98
In response to the first question, the supreme court cited the Hannah
decision as authority for applying the fireman's rule to police officers who
are investigating an accident as part of their police duties. 99 As to the
second question, the court held that firemen and policemen do not generally assume all risks that may occur while they are on duty, but that each
situation encountered "may involve some risks which are anticipated and
assumed and some which are unanticipated and therefore unassumed." o The court stated that in each case the facts "must be examined to determine if the particular risk was either hidden from or
unanticipated by the fireman or policeman and therefore not reasonably
apparent to the officer."01 It upheld the trial court's finding that officer
Griffiths could not anticipate and did not assume the risk of injury from
the downed utility pole. 102
Finally, the court held that the question of whether a particular risk is
94. Id
95. 313 N.W.2d 602 (Minn. 1981).
96. Id at 604.
97. Id
98. Id The trial court certified these questions as important and doubtful under Rule
103.03(i) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure.
99. 313 N.W.2d at 604. The legislature recently enacted a law that prohibits application of the fireman's rule to bar recovery in actions by policemen. See note 1 supra.
100. Id at 605. For further discussion of splitting risks, see notes 165-80 infra and accompanying text.
101. 313 N.W.2d at 605. The court cautioned that this holding did not mean that the
facts creating the risk must be known if the risk itself was apparent, an argument rejected
in Armstrong. See id at 605 n.2.
102. Id
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reasonably apparent to the plaintiff may be submitted to the jury in
cases in which the court does not decide the question as a matter of
law.10 3 In essence, the court said that, as in any motion for summary
judgment, if no material issue of fact is presented the trial court may
decide the issue as a matter of law and summary judgment may be
granted, but if there is a factual dispute the question should be submitted
10
to the jury in a special verdict. 4
In addition to answering the certified questions, the Grftuths court attempted to clarify the definition of primary assumption of the risk as it
appeared in Armstrong v. Mailand.10 5 Noting that both pre- and postArmstrong cases have confused primary and secondary assumption of the
risk, the court stated that:
The basic premise underlying our decision in Armstrong is that the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff and others. However, where the
plaintiff is a policeman or a fireman the defendant may be relieved of
that duty by reason of the nature of the work performed by policemen
and firemen. 106
IV.

THE MODERN FIREMAN'S RULE

The Armstrong decision discarded the outdated system of determining
landowners' liability for firemen's injuries and replaced it with modern
tort terminology.107 The old rule, based upon the fireman's status as a
licensee or as sui generis, became the new fireman's rule, based upon the
standard of reasonable care and assumption of the risk. When the theories underlying the old and new rules are examined more closely, however, this transformation proves to be less progressive than it may first
appear.
Under the old classification system, a landowner's liability was determined by the degree of duty owed to the entrant according to the entrant's status as either a trespasser, licensee, or invitee.108 Similarly, the
question of whether a plaintiff has primarily assumed the risk is actually
a question of whether the defendant had any duty to protect the plaintiff
103. Id In so holding, the court rejected the defendant's argument that the issue
presented was whether a duty existed and that the question of duty is always to be decided
by the court. Id It stated that a duty exists on the part of the defendant toward the
plaintiff but that the defendant may be relieved of that duty because of the plaintiff's
position as a police officer. This in turn raises the question of whether the risk was reasonably apparent to the officer and whether this question may be submitted to the jury if it
cannot be decided as a matter of law by the court. Id
104. Id
105. Id.; see note 110 infra.
106. 313 N.W.2d at 605.
107. 284 N.W.2d at 353.
108. See id at 348-49.
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from injury.109 The Armstrong court noted the relationship between the

classification of land entrants and primary assumption of the risk, stating: "the classification of a fireman as a 'licensee,' 'invitee,' or 'sui
generis' is just another means of determining the extent to which a fireman primarily assumes the risk and thereby relieves the landowner of his
duty to keep the premises in a safe condition."10 Just as the classification of firemen as licensees, or later as sui generis, substantially limited
their right of recovery from negligent landowners, the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk acts as a bar to recovery by firemen from
landowners except with respect to risks that are hidden or
unanticipated. II
Despite the apparent similarity, in both the underlying legal theory
and the result, between the old fireman's rule, based upon entrant classifications, and the new rule, based upon assumption of the risk, the Armstrong court viewed the change in focus to primary assumption of the risk
as producing three important results:
First, it results in consistency with the policy set forth in Peterson o.
Balach . . . of eliminating classifications of land entrants. Secondly,
the change in focus facilitates application of the fireman's rule to defendants other than owners and possessors of land. A third aspect to
the change in focus is a change in the substantive law. Presently, under
Shypulski, a landowner is not liable to the fireman unless the landowner
109. See Griffiths v. Lovelette Transfer Co., 313 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Minn. 1981); notes
6-7 supra and accompanying text.
110. 284 N.W.2d at 348-49 (quoting Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 192
N.W.2d 826 (1971)); see notes 119-43 infra and accompanying text. In Springrose, the court
distinguished between primary and secondary assumption of the risk. See Springrose v.
Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 24, 192 N.W.2d 826, 827 (1971). Primary assumption of the risk
was defined as "relat[ing] to the initial issue of whether a defendant was negligent at allthat is, whether the defendant had any duty to protect the plaintiff from a risk of harm. It
is not therefore, an affirmative defense." Id Secondary assumption of the risk, on the
other hand, is an affirmative defense to be pled by the defendant. Id. A plaintiff assumes
the risk in the secondary sense when he voluntarily encounters a known danger created by
the defendant without relieving the defendant of his duty of care. See Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343, 349 (Minn. 1979). Primary assumption of the risk is still a complete bar to a plaintiff's right of recovery. Secondary assumption of the risk was merged
with contributory negligence in Springrose; therefore, the plaintiff's negligence was apportioned with that of the defendant under the comparative negligence statute. See Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. at 24-25, 192 N.W.2d at 827. Merging secondary assumption
of the risk with contributory negligence meant that the plaintiff not only must voluntarily
encounter the danger, but the assumption of the risk must be unreasonable in all circumstances. Set Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. at 24, 192 N.W.2d at 827. For a discussion
of the historical relationship between contributory negligence and secondary assumption
of the risk, see Steenson, The Anatomy of Products Liability: Pihc:'plesof Tort Loss Allocation, 6
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 243, 246-51 (1980). Professor Steenson concludes that "in postSpringrose negligence cases, the defenses of secondary assumption of the risk, misuse, and
contributory negligence can be distilled to a single issue: did the plaintiff exercise reasonable care for his own safety?" Id at 251.
111. 284 N.W.2d at 348.
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knows of the hidden danger and negligently fails to warn the fireman of
that danger. By concluding that the sui generis classification is abolished . . . and that-landowners owe firemen a duty of reasonable care
with respect to risks that are hidden or unanticipated by the firemen, it
is obvious that the Shypulski requirement of knowledge of the danger by
the landowner and of opportunity to warn would be eliminated ....
Of course, a jury may still consider the landowner's knowledge and
opportunity, or lack thereof, in determining negligence, but lack of
knowledge and opportunity no longer bars recovery as a matter of
law. 112
The Armstrong court acknowledged that the abolition of the fireman's
status as sui generis left open the possibility of completely eliminating the
fireman's rule.i13 As support for retaining the rule, it cited the 1977 California case, Walters v. S/oan,'1 4 and quoted the portion of the decision in
which that court noted:
In recent years, the rule has been repeatedly attacked as being "behind the times," based on out-dated concepts of tort liability. However, the courts in this and other jurisdictions have answered the
attacks, pointing out the rule is premised on sound public policy and is
in accord with-if not compelled by-modern tort liability
principles ...
While modernizing has brought the law of landowner liability into
accord with current concepts of tort liability by eliminating formalistic
categories-invitees, licensees, trespassers-the fireman's rule is not
based on such categorizations. Under the old rule, all persons within
its scope were denied recovery when injured when voluntarily confronting a known peril with full realization of the risk. The changes
wrought by Rowland do not relate to the fireman's rule.
Rather, the fireman's rule is based on a principle as fundamental to
our law today as it was centuries ago. The principle is not unique to
landowner cases but is applicable to our entire system of justice--one
who has knowingly and voluntarily confronted a hazard cannot recover for injuries sustained thereby.' 15
To determine whether this rationale and the Minnesota court's decision to retain the fireman's rule in the'form of primary assumption of the
risk is sound, it is necessary first to discuss the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk itself, in light of its origins, its development, its later
separation from the defense of secondary assumption of the risk, and its
current status. In addition, because the actions in both Armstrong 1i6and
112. Id.
113. See id.at 349.
114. 20 Cal. 3d 199, 571 P.2d 609, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1977).
115. Id. at 203, 571 P.2d at 611, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 154 (citations omitted), quoted in
Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343, 349 (1979).
116. 284 N.W.2d at 347 (strict products liability and abnormally dangerous
instrumentality).
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Hannah 117 were based in whole or in part on strict liability, the application of primary assumption of the risk to strict liability, an area that is
still unsettled," l 8 will be examined.
A.

Development of Assumption of the Risk

Assumption of the risk is a term that at one time encompassed two
distinct theories.1 9 The doctrine itself developed from the common-law
master-servant cases in the mid-1800's. 120 A master had a duty to provide only a reasonably safe workplace, and had no duty to guard against
other inherent risks of employment.1 21 These latter inherent risks were
held to have been assumed by experienced workmen.' 22 A servant could
prevail against the master only if he could prove that the master had
breached his duty to maintain a reasonably safe workplace.1 23 Even if
the servant met this burden, the master could still assert an affirmative
defense by proving that the servant had voluntarily exposed himself to
the risks caused by the master's negligence.124
In these early cases, the two separate theories were given one label,
assumption of the risk. The first theory, under which the defendant
owed no duty, became known as primary assumption of the risk.' 25 Primary assumption of the risk is not an affirmative defense.12 6 It arises
when: (1) a voluntary relationship exists between the parties; (2) the
plaintiff assumes the risks incidental to the relationship; (3) the defendant is thereby relieved of a duty to the plaintiff; and (4) the reasonableness of the plaintiffs conduct is irrelevant.12 7 The plaintiff has the
burden of proving that the risk was not assumed under the relationship. 128 Primary assumption of the risk does not turn on the reasonableness of the plaintiffs conduct, but depends upon whether the defendant's
29
conduct is within the scope of the risk that the plaintiff assumed.'
117. 298 N.W.2d at 54 (statutory imposition of strict liability).
118. See Steenson, supra note 110, at 258 n.82.
119. See Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 49, 155 A.2d 90, 93
(1959).
120. See id; V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 9.1, at 155 (1974); Note,
Contributo v Negligence and Assumption ofRisk-The Casefor Their Merger, 56 MINN. L. REV.
47, 48, 50 (1971). In Canbell v. Railway Transfer Co., 95 Minn. 375, 104 N.W. 547,
(1905), the court held that assumption of the risk applied only when the defendant was the
employer of the injured party. Id at 381, 104 N.W. at 554.
121. Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 49, 155 A.2d 90, 93
(1953).
122. Id
123. Id

124.
125.
126.
127.

Id
Id
See Note, supra note 120, at 49.
See id.

128.

See id

129. See id at 50.
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The second theory was known as secondary assumption of the risk. 130
Secondary assumption of the risk was an affirmative defense, which the
defendant had the burden of pleading and proving. 13 1 Under this theory, the defendant may have had a duty to the plaintiff, but by voluntarily encountering the risk created by the defendant's breach of duty, the
plaintiff relieves the defendant of liability and assumes the risk.' 3 2 The
plaintiff may have acted reasonably or unreasonably and still have as33
sumed the risk.'
Much confusion resulted from giving one label-assumption of the
risk-to two distinct theories, one focusing upon the defendant's duty to
the plaintiff and the other upon the plaintiffs conduct in encountering
the risk.' 3 4 This confusion was compounded by the similarity between
secondary assumption of the risk and the separate defense of contributory negligence.' 3 5 Both secondary assumption of the risk and contributory negligence focused on the plaintiffs conduct, 136 but they were
viewed as separate defenses because "secondary assumption of the risk
rest[ed] upon plaintiffs voluntary consent to take his chances, while contributory negligence rest[ed] upon plaintiffs failure to exercise the care of
a reasonable man for his own protection."37 When the plaintiffs voluntary assumption of the risk was unreasonable, however, the two defenses
38
overlapped, and the distinction between them became meaningless.'
The New Jersey Supreme Court chose to avoid this confusion by combining secondary assumption of the risk with contributory negligence,
130. Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 50, 155 A.2d 90, 93
(1953).
131. Id
132. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 68, at 440; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
§ 496A, Comment c (1965).
133. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 68, at 440-4 1; see Standafer v. First National Bank,
243 Minn. 442, 68 N.W.2d 362 (1955); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A, Comment c(4) (1965).
134. Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 50-51, 155 A.2d 90, 93-94
(1953).
135. Id at 51, 155 A.2d at 94.
136. See Stenzel v. Bach, 295 Minn. 257, 203 N.W.2d 819 (1973) (contributory negligence and assumption of risk both determined by whether plaintiff put self in position to
encounter known hazard); Note, supra note 120, at 51.
137. Note, supra note 120, at 51; see Haessly v. Lotzer, 309 Minn. 498, 245 N.W.2d 841
(1976); Meulners v. Hawkes, 299 Minn. 261, 216 N.W.2d 633 (1974); Lieser v. Northern
States Power Co., 268 Minn. 95, 128 N.W.2d 292 (1964); Erickson v. Van Web Equip.
Co., 270 Minn. 42, 132 N.W.2d 814 (1964); Schneider v. Texas Co., 244 Minn. 131, 69
N.W.2d 329 (1955).
138. See Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977); Hanson v. Bailey,
249 Minn. 495, 83 N.W.2d 252 (1957); W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 68, at 441; V.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 120, § 9.1, at 155. When the defenses overlapped, the defendant
generally could plead either or both of them. See Parness v. Economics Laboratory, Inc.,
284 Minn. 381, 170 N.W.2d 554 (1969); W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 68, at 441.
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treating both under the standard of reasonableness.139 It stated:
[W]e think it is clear that assumption of the risk in its secondary
sense is a mere phase of contributory negligence, the total issue being
whether a reasonably prudent man in the exercise of due care
(a) would have incurred the known risk and (b) if he would, whether
such a person in light of all of the circumstances including the appreciated risk would have conducted himself in the manner in which plaintiff acted. 140

The theory of primary assumption of the risk was retained and was
phrased in terms of the defendant's negligence. 14.1 If the defendant owed
no duty there was no negligence. 14 2 The plaintiff assumed only those
risks -against which the defendant owed no duty to protect the plaintiff.
The plaintiff could therefore recover for those risks as to which defendant
had a duty that was negligently breached, unless the defendant proved
that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent.143
In Minnesota, primary and secondary assumption of the risk and con144
If
tributory negligence remained separate theories for many years.
successfully pleaded, they acted as a complete bar to a plaintiff's recovery. 145 In 1969, the Minnesota Legislature enacted a comparative negligence statute, under which contributory negligence was not a bar to
recovery unless the plaintiff's negligence was equal to or greater than the
defendant's.14 6 The statute did not refer to assumption of the risk, leaving open the question of whether assumption of the risk remained a complete defense. 14 7 In 1971, the Minnesota Supreme Court followed the
139. See Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 54, 155 A.2d 90, 95-96
(1953).
140. Id
141. Id;see McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co., 41 N.J. 272, 275, 196 A.2d 238, 23940 (1963).
142. See Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 56, 155 A.2d 90, 96
(1953).
143. See id
144. See Note, supra note 120, at 47.
145. See id
146. See Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 624, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069 (current version at
MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1980)).
147. See Parness v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., 284 Minn. 381, 386, 170 N.W.2d 554,
557 (1969). One argument against merging the two defenses was that contributory negligence, by definition, included only unreasonable conduct, while assumption of the risk
could apply to reasonable conduct as well. See Note, supra note 120, at 53. While this
argument appeared logical, in fact the courts had never applied secondary assumption of
the risk when the plaintiff's conduct was reasonable (although primary assumption had
been so applied) and so there was no practical distinction between contributory negligence
and assumption of the risk in the secondary sense. See Note, supra note 120, at 53-54.
In a recent Minnesota case, the trial court ruled that the finding that the plaintiff had
assumed the risk barred recovery because the cause of action arose after the enactment of
the comparative negligence statute, but before the Spn7grose decision. The supreme court
did not challenge the holding on that ground, but reversed because the evidence of as-
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lead of the New Jersey court and merged secondary assumption of the
risk with contributory negligence under the comparative negligence statute.' 48 This merger meant that a plaintiffs voluntary and unreasonable
confrontation of a risk would be compared with the negligence of the
defendant to determine fault.14 9 In 1978, the Minnesota Legislature rewrote the comparative negligence statute in terms of comparative
fault. I50 The statute defines fault as:
[A]cts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless toward
the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a person to
strict tort liability. The term also includes breach of warranty, unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting an express consent, misuse
of a product and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate
damages. Legal requirements of causal relation apply both to fault as
the basis for liability and to contributory fault. 15 t
Primary assumption of the risk was not merged and therefore remains
a separate theory.152 If the defendant is relieved of a duty to the plaintiff, primary assumption of the risk remains a complete bar to
recovery. 153
B. Assumption of the Risk and the Fireman's Rule
Although primary assumption of the risk remains a complete bar to
recovery, 54 it has rarely been applied except in cases involving licensees
entering upon land or patrons of sporting events that are considered inherently dangerous. I5 5 The Minnesota court nevertheless found that a
fireman's rule based upon primary assumption of the risk was "in accord
with-if not compelled by-modern tort principles."156
In distinguishing primary from secondary assumption of the risk in the
context of the fireman's rule, the court quoted the New Jersey Supreme
Court:
The rationale of the prevailing rule is sometimes stated in terms of
"assumption of risk," used doubtless in the so-called "primary" sense of

the term and meaning that the defendant did not breach a duty owed,
rather than that the fireman was guilty of contributory fault in resumption of the risk was insufficient. See Wegscheider v. Plastics, Inc., 289 N.W.2d 167
(Minn. 1980).
148. Springrose v. Wilimore, 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971); see note 110 supra
and accompanying text.
149. Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 24-25, 192 N.W.2d 826, 827 (1971).
150. See Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, §§ 6, 7, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 839-40 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1980)).
151. MINN. STAT. § 604.01(la) (1980).
152. See Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 24, 192 N.W.2d 826, 827 (1971).
153. See id.; Steenson, supra note 110, at 246-51; Note, supra note 120, at 49.
154. See Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 24, 192 N.W.2d 826, 827 (1971).
155. See id; Steenson, supra note 110, at 246-51; Note, supra note 102, at 49.
156. See Armstrong v. Mailand, 284 N.W.2d 343, 348 (1979) (quoting Walters v.
Sloan, 20 Cal. 3d 199, 571 P.2d 609, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1977)).
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sponding to his public duty. 157
The court's application of primary assumption of the risk to firemen and
policemen raises several questions. First, the court seems to assume that
a fireman's assumption of the risk is voluntary, since nowhere does it
discuss that aspect of primary assumption of the risk.' 58 The voluntariness of a fireman's or a policeman's conduct is questionable in light of the
nature of their employment. Firemen and policemen have a legal and
moral duty to the community to protect lives and property from
harm.1 59 While it is true that they initially accept employment voluntarily, firemen and policemen are not allowed to pick and choose among
the dangers that they are willing to face. The obligation to fight fires
and to respond to police calls without regard to personal safety benefits
society by assuring that reliable, professionally-trained public servants
are available.
One court, in determining that a highway patrolman had not assumed
the risk of injury incurred while clearing a highway of obstructions,
noted:
The evidence justifies the conclusion that the plaintiff did not voluntarily accept the risk in question. He was under an obligation to clear the
highway of obstructions. His choice, being dictated by a legal and
moral duty, was not voluntary within the requirements of the
doctrine. 160
This holding is consistent with the principle, known as the rescue doctrine, that "those who dash in to save their own property, or the lives or
property of others, from a peril created by the defendant's negligence, do
not assume the risk where the alternative is to allow the threatened harm
to occur."161 The rescue doctrine appears to be based upon two grounds:
one, that the plaintiff may have no reasonable alternative to assuming
the risk, 162 and two, that the ordinary person will assume a greater risk to
rescue persons or property, and that one who creates the need for rescue
157. Id at 348 (quoting Krauth v. Geller, 31 NJ. 270, 273, 157 A.2d 129, 130 (1960)).
158. Assumption of the risk must be voluntary. See Bakhos v. Driver, 275 N.W.2d 594
(Minn. 1979); Seidl v. Trollhaugen, 305 Minn. 906, 232 N.W.2d 236 (1975); Donald v.
Moses, 254 Minn. 186, 94 N.W.2d 255 (1959); Note, supra note 120, at 48-49.
159. SetBilyeu v. Standard Freight Lines, 182 Cal. App. 2d 536, 6 Cal. Rptr. 65
(1960).
160. Id at 545, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
161. W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 68, at 451; see Schroeder v. Jesco, 296 Minn. 447, 209
N.W.2d 414 (1973) (defendant must leave plaintiff reasonable alternative); Parness v. Economics Laboratory, Inc., 284 Minn. 381, 170 N.W.2d 554 (1969) (must be safe alternate
course of conduct); Stephenson v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 277 Minn. 190, 152 N.W.2d 138
(1967); Cogswell v. U.S.S. Yorktown Post 178, V.F.W., 274 Minn. 154, 143 N.W.2d 45
(1966) (no assumption of risk where plaintiff has no choice but hazardous route).
162. See W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 68, at 451; cases cited at note 161 supra. The
Reskatement sets out the following standards for voluntary assumption of the risk:
(1) A plaintiff does not assume a risk of harm unless he voluntarily accepts
the risk.
(2) The plaintiff's acceptance of a risk is not voluntary if the defendant's
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should foresee that another may be injured while responding to that
need. 163 In either case, the doctrine of assumption of the risk should not
164
bar the plaintiff from recovery.
A second question that was raised by the Armstrong decision and was
answered in Griffiths is whether policemen or firemen assume all risks encountered in the course of their duties. In Armstong, the court found that
because the firemen had received training in fighting LP gas fires, they
knowingly assumed the risk that the tank on the Mailand property
would explode.' 65 In the court's view, the fact that the tank had hidden
defects that increased the likelihood of a BLEVE did not make the risk
an unanticipated one. 166
In two prior decisions not involving police officers or firemen, Wegscheider v. Plastics,Inc. 167 and Bigham v. J C Penney Co. ,16 the Minnesota
court was willing to separate the risks involved and to find that while the
plaintiffs may have assumed one risk, they were not barred from recovery
for a hidden or unknown risk, even if both the assumed and the unassumed risks contributed to their injuries. In Bigham, a Northern States
Power Company lineman was injured when a "flashover" occurred while
he was repairing an NSP substation.169 His injuries were aggravated
when the work clothes he was wearing ignited and produced a "melt and
cling" effect. 170 The court held that the plaintiff had assumed the risk of
tortious conduct has left him no reasonable alternative course of conduct in order to
(a) avert harm to himself or another, or
(b) exercise or protect a right or privilege of which the defendant has
no right to deprive him.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 496E (1965).

163. See Peterson v. W.T. Rawleigh Co., 274 Minn. 495, 144 N.W.2d 555 (1966)
(plaintiff does not assume risk when defendant's tortious action creates dilemma and
leaves plaintiff no alternative); W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 68, at 451; Comment, The New
Minnesota Fireman's Rule-An Application of the Assumption of Risk Doctrine: Armstrong v.
Mailand, 64 MINN. L. REV. 879, 886 (1980).
The Restatement gives the following illustrations of the rescue doctrine:
2. A Railroad negligently sets a fire on its right of way, which burns toward B's house. In order to save the house B attempts to extinguish the fire,
although he knows that there is a risk that he may be burned in doing so. B does
not assume the risk.
3. A Railroad is negligent in failing to give warning of the approach of its
train to a crossing, and thereby endangers B, a blind man who is about to cross.
C, a bystander, in a reasonable effort to save B, rushes onto the track to push B
out of danger. Although C acts as carefully as possible, he is struck and injured
by the train. C does not assume the risk.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496E, Comment c, at 577-78 (1965).
164. See W. PROSSER, supra note 6, § 68, at 451.
165. 284 N.W.2d at 352-53.
166. Id at 353.
167. 289 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 1980).
168. 268 N.W.2d 892 (Minn. 1978).
169. Id at 894.
170. Id at 895.
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the "flashover" because he could anticipate encountering that risk during the course of his employment. The court, however, found that he
had not assumed the risk of the clothes' flammability, of which he had
not been warned and had no knowledge.' 71 Because the plaintiff had
assumed his employment risks, NSP was not liable to him for his injuries, 172 but since he was found not to assume the risk of injury from the
melting of the work clothes, he was allowed to recover from the clothes'
manufacturer. '

73

In Wegsche'der, the plaintiff, a truck driver, was injured while hoisting
equipment to the top of a tanker truck.' 74 The driver lost his balance
and fell from the truck when the rope he was using to lift the equipment
was severed by jagged material on the side of the tanker.175 He sued on
grounds of strict liability and negligence.' 76 The court held that although the plaintiff was aware of a general risk of injury from a fall from
a tanker-trailer, he did not assume the risk of a hidden defect on the
7
particular trailer on which he was injured. 1 7
The question of whether the court would allow risk-splitting in fireman's rule cases was answered in Gnjiths.178 Citing Bigham and Wegscheider, the court stated:
[F]iremen and policemen do not, by accepting dangerous employment,
generally assume all risk that may occur. Rather, each situation enand
countered may involve risks which are anticipated and 1assumed
79
some which are unanticipated and therefore unassumed.
In Griffiths, the court found that the risk of being knocked down by a
utility pole that flew into the air when the guide wire caught on the
bumper of a car was not one assumed by the police officer.18 0 Presumably the officer did assume other potential risks while investigating the
accident scene.
The court distinguished the facts in Griffths from the situation in Armstrong, in which the facts underlying the risk of the BLEVE were hidden
but the risk of the explosion itself was known to the firemen.18 1 In Gr ffiths, the facts that gave rise to the risk were known because the wire and
171.
172.

Id at 895-96.
Id at 898-99. The court found that assumption of the risk acted as a complete

bar to recovery because the cause of action arose prior to Spnngrose. See td at 899. This is
confusing because Sprngrose changed the result only as to secondary assumption of the
risk, and the facts of Bigham seem to indicate that the lineman primarily assumed the risks
of his employment.
173. See id at 896-99; note 110 supra.
174. See 289 N.W.2d at 169.
175. Seeid
176. Seeid
177. See id at 170.
178. ee 313 N.W.2d 602 (Minn. 1981).
179. Id at 605.
180. Id
181. Id
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the attached pole were in plain view, but the risk itself was not foreseeable. The court apparently rejected the defendant's argument that a risk
must be hidden to be unanticipated. The court pointed to the language
of Armstrong that states that firemen do not assume risks that are hidden
or unanticipated, thereby emphasizing its intent to create two exceptions
to the fireman's rule, not one.182
A third and more general, question raised by the fireman's rule decisions is whether the rule is supported by public policy.18 3 Although the
Minnesota court has not discussed specifically the various considerations
that might support the rule, other writers have set forth certain policies
that have influenced courts to adopt the rule. These considerations include the burden on landowners, the need to spread the risk of loss to the
public, and the possible increase in litigation. 184
The first consideration-the burden that imposition of liability would
place on landowners-ignores the basic tort principle that negligent persons are liable to whom injury is foreseeable. 185 Any burden of liability
should fall upon only those landowners who were in fact negligent in
causing a fire. 186 The fireman's rule, by allowing negligent persons to
escape liability, does not encourage the public to use care in maintaining
property and to avoid carelessly starting fires.1 8 7 The rule has been criticized on the ground that "[a]ny rule of law that fails to promote vigilance but instead exempts persons responsible should be questioned."1 8 8

The second consideration-the need to spread the loss from fire to the
public by compensating injured firemen out of public funds-can be criticized on grounds similar to those discussed above. The weaknesses in
the loss-spreading rationale have been stated as follows:
First, the doctrine forces the public to underwrite tortfeasors. This contravenes basic principles of negligence which place the loss with the
cause. Secondly, the argument ignores the role of insurance. It is the
business of insurance to accept risks in return for payment. Placing the
risk of injury to firemen with the fire insurer would obviously have the
effect of passing on the additional costs to those insured. The ultimate
effect of such allocation of risk is spreading it, but spreading it among
182. Id at 604-05.
183. See Comment, supra note 163, at 887. The California Supreme Court stated in

Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968), that exceptions should not be made to the general rule that persons must use reasonable care to
avoid injury to others unless "clearly supported by public policy." Id. at 112, 443 P.2d at
564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
184. See Comment, supra note 163, at 886.
185. See Comment, Giorgi v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.: The "Fireman'sRule"In Calfornia, An Anachronzsm?, supra note 10, at 131-34.

186. See Comment, supra note 163, at 888-89.
187. See Comment, Giorgi v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.: The "Fireman'sRule"In California, An Anachronism?, supra note 10, at 134.

188. Id.
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those who are deserved of the burden.18 9
The policy of denying recovery to firemen because of the availability of
public funds for compensation seems particularly unfair when firemen
and policemen are compared with other employees.190 In all cases, the
funds may be inadequate to compensate fully for injuries. Although
their job risks may be considerably greater than those of the average
worker, firemen and policemen are unable to bring an action against
negligent third parties for uncompensated damages.191
The third consideration-the fear that allowing injured firemen and
policemen to bring an action against any person whose negligence causes
the injury would result in a flood of litigation-is also invalid. It violates
the basic principle of our legal system that no one should be denied the
opportunity to protect personal rights simply to avoid problems of judicial administration.1 9 2 It has also been noted that the predicted increase
in litigation would probably not materialize because minor injuries
would be covered by workers' compensation; thus, actions would be
brought only for damages above the amount not compensated by public
funds. 193
The retention of the fireman's rule is not only unsupported by public
policy, but contravenes it by denying a right of recovery to injured
firemen and policemen, who perform a considerable public service. Negligent persons, whose actions could endanger not only policemen and
firemen but the entire community, are exonerated. The Minnesota
Supreme Court in Armstrong, Hannah, and Griftiths failed to provide any
reasons for retaining the fireman's rule.
189. Id at 133; see Court v. Grzelinski, 72 Il. 2d 141, 150, 379 N.E.2d 281, 284-85
(1978); Comment, An Examination of the CaliforniaFireman'sRule, supra note 10, at 671-72;
Comment, supra note 163, at 889.
The Rowland court dismissed the argument that the imposition of liability on landowners would decrease the availability of insurance and increase its cost, pointing to the
lack of evidence in support of that prediction. See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108,
118, 443 P.2d 561, 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103-04 (1968).
190. See Comment, supra note 163, at 887-88.
191. Id
192. See Court v. Grzelinski, 72 Ill. 2d 141, 379 N.E.2d 281 (1978), in which the California court's use of this justification was criticized as follows:
California would also preclude recovery by firemen because of the potential
problems and lengthy trials that might arise with the need for a judicial determination on the cause of a fire. We find this policy consideration unpersuasive for
two reasons. First, Illinois law requires that every fire, by which property has
been destroyed or damaged, be investigated as to its cause, origin and circumstances. . . . More importantly, courts may not compromise their basic responsibility to decide the merits of each case merely because it would be
administratively convenient to sweep away a class of plaintiffs whose claims may
be difficult to adjudicate.
Id at 150, 379 N.E.2d at 285; see Comment, supra note 163, at 888 & n.59..
193. See Comment, supra note 163, at 888.
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Assumption of the Risk and Strict Liabiliy

Any discussion of policy considerations applies with equal or greater
strength to the use of the fireman's rule as a complete bar to recovery
against persons other than landowners who are strictly liable for injuries
incurred by firemen or policemen.194 Although the use of common-law
defenses in actions based upon strict liability has been the subject of
much discussion,1 95 it is clear that in Minnesota the plaintiff's fault may
be compared with that of the defendant in a strict liability action. 196
The definition of fault under the comparative fault statute now expressly
includes acts that subject a person to strict tort liability and the defenses
of unreasonable assumption of the risk, "misuse of a product and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury."197
The doctrine of primary assumption of the risk, which acts as a complete bar to recovery, has never been applied to a strict liability action in
Minnesota, although an analogous theory exists in strict liability cases.1 98
Courts have allowed a plaintiff's conduct in "deliberately encountering a
known and obvious risk"199 to bar recovery for injuries from a defective
product.20 0 This theory, known as the latent-patent rule or the Campo
doctrine, 20 1 has been severely criticized as contrary to underlying social
and economic policies of products liability law because it allows the manufacturer of a defective product to avoid liability completely. 20 2 Like
primary assumption of the risk, the latent-patent rule is not an affirmative defense.20 3 The plaintiff must prove that the dangerousness of the
product was not obvious. 2 0 4 Like primary assumption of the risk, the

latent-patent doctrine acts as a complete bar to recovery despite the
20 5
existence of a comparative negligence statute.
Despite the controversy over the use of the latent-patent doctrine in
strict liability actions, the Minnesota court found that the similar doctrine of primary assumption of the risk may be used to bar recovery on
194. See Court v. Grzelinski, 72 Ill. 2d 141, 148-49, 379 N.E.2d 281, 284 (1978).
195. See Steenson, supra note 110, at 257-60; Note, Contributog Fault and Strict Products
Liabiliy: A Reappraisal, 2 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 235, 239 (1976).
196. See Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977); Magnuson v.
Rupp Mfg., Inc., 285 Minn. 32, 171 N.W.2d 201 (1969); Steenson, supra note 110, at 25760.
197. MINN. STAT. § 604.01(la) (1980).
198. See Comment, Obviousness of Product Dangersas a Bar to Recovery: Minnesota Apparently
Adopts the Latent-PatentDoctrine, 3 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 241, 241, 244 & n.26 (1977).
199. Park v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 289 N.W.2d 456, 460 (Minn. 1980).
200. See Halvorson v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 307 Minn. 48, 240 N.W.2d 303
(1976).
201. See Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950); Comment, supra note
198, at 243.
202. See Comment, supra note 198, at 243, 261-62.
203. See id at 253.
204. See id at 253-54.
205. See id. at 254.
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the strict liability claims in both Armstrong206 and Hannah.207 In Armstrong, assumption of the risk was held to bar the plaintiffs from recovering, not only against the owner of the property on which the fire
occurred, but against the manufacturer and the installer of the defective
gas tank and the gas supplier. 208 In Hannah, the action of the plaintiff, a
policeman, was barred by assumption of the risk even though the statute
under which the action was brought imposed strict liability on the defendant.2 09 In neither case did the court discuss the significance of the
application of a total defense to strict liability actions, nor did the court
offer sufficient justification or explanation for the extension. The court
simply stated that the policies underlying strict liability were not so
strong that a plaintiff could not "implicitly or expressly, manifest his consent to relieve the defendant of his duty." 2 10 In Hannah, the court noted
that had the Dram Shop Act imposed absolute liability, the fireman's
21
rule would not have applied.
By failing to discuss fully the impact of assumption of the risk on strict
liability, the court ignored the fact that allowing a defendant completely
to avoid liability for injuries, particularly those caused by defective products, contravened the basic policies that strict products liability was
designed to enforce.2 12 Strict liability is imposed upon manufacturers
because of their superior ability to spread the risk of loss and because the
law encourages the manufacture of safe products. 21 3 An anomalous situation is created when the manufacturer can avoid liability. This unfair
result has been explained as follows:
When the assumption of risk defense is allowed, the plaintiff is required to bear the entire cost of his injury, while the defendant is exonerated despite marketing a dangerously defective product. The cost of
the injuries, therefore, is not spread to the users and consumers of the
product and the seller's superior risk-bearing capabilities are not utilized. In addition to being contrary to the policies of strict liability, this
result is also unfair to the plaintiff who suffers the injury, especially if
his culpability is relatively inconsequential when compared with the
injury caused by the defective product. The result of invoking the assumption of risk defense in employment accident cases is even harsher.
The plaintiff-employee has little choice but to work with the defective
machinery, yet if he becomes aware of the defect he often is barred
from recovery. The assumption of risk defense is thus contrary to the
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
point in
the risk
213.

284 N.W.2d 343, 352-53 (Minn. 1979).
298 N.W.2d 52, 54 (Minn. 1980).
Set 284 N.W.2d at 352-53.
See 298 N.W.2d at 54.
284 N.W.2d at 352; see 298 N.W.2d at 54.
See 298 N.W.2d at 54.
See Note, supra note 195, at 239; Comment, supra note 198. The authors make this
relation to contributory fault. The result is even more harsh when assumption of
acts as a complete bar to recovery.
Note, supra note 195, at 239.
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spirit of the strict liability theory. 2 14
In addition to failing to recognize the strong policy considerations underlying the imposition of strict liability on manufacturers, the Armstrong
court apparently ignored the requirement that to find that a plaintiff
assumed the risk in a particular situation, a voluntary relationship, either
2
express or implied, must exist between the plaintiff and the defendant. 15
While such a relationship may arguably exist between firemen and the
owners of property for whose protection the firemen were employed, it is
considerably more difficult to imply a voluntary relationship between
firemen and the manufacturer or the installer of a defective product that
the firemen happened to encounter. The court made no attempt to find
such a relationship, but simply leapt from an application of the doctrine
2 6
to one defendant to an application to all defendants. 1
In a similar case, the Illinois Supreme Court declined to extend the
fireman's rule to a manufacturer and an installer of a defective product.2 17 In Court . Grzelinski,2 18 the plaintiff, a fireman, was injured while
fighting a fire that had erupted in an automobile. An explosion ignited
gasoline and caused it to shoot up from the car onto the plaintiff.2 19 The
firemen brought an action against the manufacturer of the gas tank and
the used car dealer who had installed the tank in the car.2 20 He alleged
that the tank was defective and that the dealer had installed it in a defective manner. 22 1 In refusing to allow the fireman's rule to bar recovery
against the defendants, the court noted that the fireman's rule was based
upon certain policy considerations 222 limiting the liability of landowners. 223 It stated:
Defendants attempt to extend the "fireman's rule" beyond its limited
context of landowner/occupier liability. The rule cannot be extended
to a free-floating proposition that a fireman cannot recover for injuries
resulting from risks inherently involved in fire fighting. To do so would
be tantamount to imposing the doctrine of assumption of risk onto the
occupation of fire fighting and would be directly contrary to the limited concept of assumption of risk in Illinois. In negligence actions,
assumption of risk is confined to those situations involving persons who
have a contractual or employment relationship with the defendant. In
products liability actions such as this, assumption of risk is a bar to
recovery only if the plaintiff is aware of the product defect and voluntarily proceeds in disregard to the known danger. In either case, assump214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id at 242-44.
See text accompanying note 127 supra.
See 284 N.W.2d at 35253.
Court v. Grzelinski, 72 Ill. 2d 141, 379 N.E.2d 281 (1978).
Id
Id at 145, 379 N.E.2d at 289.
Id
Id
See id at 148, 379 N.E.2d at 283-84; notes 161-93 supra and accompanying text.
Court v. Grzelinski, 72 Ill. 2d 141, 148-49, 379 N.E.2d 281, 284 (1978).
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tion of risk is an affirmative defense interposed against a plaintiff who
voluntarily exposes himself to a specific, known risk, not a preclusion of
recovery against a plaintiff whose occupation inherently involves gen224
eral risks of injury.
The majority opinion in Court was accompanied by a lengthy dissent 22 5 in which the fireman's rule was defined as a limitation on the
duty owed to firemen by all persons, not just landowners and occupiers. 226 It pointed out that the majority opinion, if taken to its extreme,
would give the following result:
The majority appears to be willing to apply the fireman's rule only
in the "limited context of landowner/occupier liability." This implies
that the majority would not permit a fireman to recover for injuries he
receives in extinguishing a fire in my automobile which I negligently
caused by pouring gasoline on the hot manifold if the automobile is
parked in my driveway, but that he would be permitted to recover if
my automobile is parked in the street. This appears to me not only to
be extremely illogical but also to possibly present some constitutional
227
questions.
The result is not illogical, however, if the landowner and occupier classifications are viewed as relevant only to injuries resulting from the negligent use or maintenance of land. 228 If viewed in such a manner, the
fireman's injuries in Court, which resulted from personal, affirmative negligence of the defendants, would not be limited by the classification system whether they occurred on or off the defendant's property, but
229
instead would be determined by ordinary negligence standards.
The dissent focused on the question of whether the particular danger
was one that firemen would anticipate in performing their firefighting
duties.230 It concluded that a gasoline explosion could be foreseen when
an automobile was on fire. 231 In addition, the dissent asserted that
firemen were not among those persons entitled to protection under the
theory of strict liability. 232 This conclusion was based upon the minority's view that firemen were not "individuals to whom injury from a defective product may reasonably be foreseen."233
The dissent's challenge to the imposition of strict products liability on
the basis of foreseeability in Court may be valid in view of the facts of the
case. In Court, the defendants manufactured and installed a defective
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id
Id
Id
Id
See
See
See
See
See
Id

at 151, 379 N.E.2d at 285 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
at 152, 379 N.E.2d at 286 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
at 152-53, 379 N.E.2d at 286 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
Maldondo v. Jack M. Berry Grove Corp., 351 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 1977).
2d 141, 149, 379 N.E.2d 281, 284 (1978).
Court v. Grzelinski, 72 Ill.
id at 155, 379 N.E.2d at 287 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
id (Ryan, J., dissenting).
id at 156, 379 N.E.2d at 287-88 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
at 157, 379 N.E.2d at 288 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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automobile gas tank. 234 Harm to firemen from a defective automobile

may be less foreseeable than harm to the car owner or passengers. The
lack of foreseeability in one case, however, does not justify a denial of
recovery to firemen in all cases involving defective products. An analogy
may be made to bystander cases in which liability for a defective product
has been extended beyond purchasers and users to other parties injured
by the defect. 2 35 Bystanders to whom injury was foreseeable have been
found to be entitled to greater protection than consumers because the
bystanders were unable to control the purchase or to inspect the
36
product. 2
This rationale can easily be applied to the facts in Armstrong.237 Although the court in that case did not discuss the question of foreseeability
from the perspective of the defendants, it found that, from the plaintiff's
point of view, the risk of an explosion of an LP gas tank was readily
apparent. 238 From this determination, it seems obvious that the risk of
an explosion is reasonably foreseeable because LP gas tanks are often
installed on private property, which policemen could be summoned to
protect.
In light of the strong public policy favoring recovery in products liability cases, the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff firemen, and the generally harsh result of allowing a total defense, the court should not have
extended the fireman's rule to bar recovery against the manufacturer
and installer in Armstrong. The same criticism can be applied to the holding in Hannah v. Jensen, in which a statute reflected public policy favoring
the imposition of strict liability.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Armstrong v. Mailand, the Minnesota Supreme Court revamped the
fireman's rule by explaining it in terms of primary assumption of the risk
rather than the outdated law relating to landowners' liability. The rule
has since been expanded to include policemen,239 and has been somewhat more liberally construed to allow for a chse-by-case determination
of the application of the rule, the separation of assumed and unassumed
risk in each situation, and the opportunity for firemen and policemen in
certain circumstances to present their cases to a jury. Unfortunately, ad234.

Id

at 146, 379 N.E.2d at 282.

235. See Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 587, 451 P.2d 84, 89, 75
Cal. Rptr. 652, 656-57 (1969).
236. Id at 586, 451 P.2d at 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
237. 284 N.W.2d 343 (Minn. 1980).
238. Id at 352-53.
239. The legislature has since determined that the rule should not be applied to policemen. See note I supra. There does not appear to be any reason to distinguish between
policemen and firemen in the application of the rule. It is likely that firemen will either
request the legislature to amend the law to include all public employees, thus abrogating
the rule completely, or bring an action to challenge the law on equal protection grounds.
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equate attention has not been given in these recent cases to the issue of
whether the rule should be retained in any form or to the many countervailing policies that support recovery of damages by policemen and
firemen for injuries negligently caused by third parties. It is hoped that
trial courts will take advantage of the holding in Griffiths by allowing
plaintiffs in fireman's rule cases to present their claims to the jury instead
of granting summary judgment. In that way the community served by
the policemen and firemen can determine whether the injured officers
should be allowed to recover for injuries caused by members of the
public.
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